Several theorists have argued that social policy in East Asia can be seen as representing a distinctive welfare ideal type based around 'productive welfare'. However, we have contested such claims in earlier work (Hudson and Kühner, 2009 ) and, in common with theorists such as Castells, have suggested that some of the OECD welfare states have a distinct bias towards the 'productive' rather than 'protective' dimensions of welfare. In this paper, we build on our earlier work, utilising fuzzy set ideal type analysis (FSITA) to explore the balance between 'productive' and protective' dimensions of welfare state activity. Here we extend our analysis beyond the OECD, incorporating a range of nations on the 'fringe' of the OECD from Latin America, East Asia and the non-OECD parts of Europe. In so doing, we contest simple notions of welfare regimes aligning with regional blocks. Primarily, however, we highlight the advantages of the 'diversity orientated' approach to data analysis that fuzzy set methods facilitate in comparison with standard quantitative techniques. In particular, we utilize FSITA to avoid data availability and reliability issues that have plagued quantitatively informed classifications of global welfare regimes. Not least, we argue FSITA allows for the contextualisation of cases in a way that is sealed to quantitatively driven, comparative research. Thus, we argue FSITA has an important role to play in attempts to extend the inclusiveness of the 'welfare modelling business' in a manner that reflects diverse and highly significant cases beyond the Western lens that dominates the literature.
even conflicting, components. Finally, by forcing us to think about the links between data and concepts, FSITA offers a bridge between quantitative and qualitative approaches. In particular, by recognising that not all variation matters, FSITA avoids the distorting effects of extreme values that can thwart some quantitative analyses. These advantages have been well established in the growing fuzzy-set literature (see: e.g. Kvist 2007 ).
The aim of this paper is to show that the diversity-oriented approach offered by FSITA has a further strength particularly for attempts to broaden the sample of countries included in typologies beyond the OECD. Since Esping-Andersen's original work was published there have been lively discussions highlighting characteristics of welfare policies in East Asia (see Holliday, 2000 , Holliday, 2005 Holliday & Wilding, 2003; Kwon 1997 , Kwon & Holliday, 2007 , Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America and considerable debate about how they might relate to the 'three worlds of welfare' thesis. One can distinguish two broad approaches in this emerging 'global welfare regimes debate': one literature that focuses on single regions exclusively and mainly tries to draw out regional differences in welfare types (Central and Eastern Europe: Fenger 2007, Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Latin America: Martinez Franzoni 2008 , Filgueria 1998 ; and, in contrast, more general approaches that include countries across all continents, and that often end up emphasizing similarities within regions over crosscontinental variation (Abu Shark and Gough 2010 , Rudra 2007 , Gough and Wood 2004 , Wood and Gough 2006 , Barrientos 2009 ).
How, then, can FSITA offer advantages in the global welfare regimes debate? Our answer to this question will begin by briefly outlining the substantive premise of FSITA and methodological challenge it addresses (Section 2). Subsequently, we show what we believe are the core advantages it has offered us in our attempts to classify welfare regimes in high-income countries based on their protective and productive intent (Section 3). This will lead us back to a methodological debate about how, more generally, FSITA can help us move beyond common data availability and outlier issues that have hampered the relatively young 'global welfare modelling business'. In particular, we will demonstrate that FSITA allows comparative social policy analysts to utilise their substantive knowledge not just of concepts and cases but also of data sources (Section 4). Thus, we present a classification of welfare states in 55 high and higher-middle income countries across all continents by utilizing different measures and fuzzy-set calibrations based on different country contexts (Section 5). We round off the paper by discussing the findings our method produces before offering an assessment of the strengths and limitations of the approach (Section 6).
Beyond the OECD: Utilising FSITA
FSITA has its origins in fuzzy set social science (Ragin, 2000) . Its starting point is that c a s e s a r e b e s t u n d e r s t o o d a s d i s t i n c t a n d d i f f e r i n g c o n f i g u r a t i o n s o f m u l t i p l e , conceptually rooted, dimensions. Given this, the first practical step for those undertaking FSITA is to specify the key conceptual dimensions that are the focus of analysis and then proceed by viewing each of these dimensions as a 'set' in which the cases can have varying degrees of membership. Sets are 'fuzzy' because in the real world 'crisp' boundaries are rare occurrences: FSITA reflects this by analysing cases on the basis of their graded, partial memberships of sets.
The operationalisation of FSITA proceeds by assigning each case a score between 0 (full non-membership) and 1 (full membership) for each set being examined. Rather than simply rescaling raw data via arithmetic computation, it allows researchers to reconsider their quantitative and qualitative data from a conceptual viewpoint (Ragin 2007) . FSITA thus differs from traditional quantitative approaches as it requires researchers to calibrate individual variables on the basis of 'external, dependably known standards' and is not content with using 'very crude but passive' mean averages and standard deviations which depend highly on characteristics of individual samples (Ragin 2008: 77) . In short, FSITA demands that researchers consider how raw data relates to verbal descriptors of their concepts and to specify qualitative breakpoints at the top (fully in) and bottom (fully out) of their sets (see Kvist, 1999 Kvist, , 2006 Kvist, and 2007 . Ragin (2000) outlines numerous techniques for specifying the values between these two breakpoints. For FSITA the s c o r e s f o r e a c h f u z z y s e t a r e e s s e n t i a l . W h a t i s e q u al l y i m p o r t a n t i s h o w multiple dimensions are combined. Two key principles of logic are utilised to analyse combinations of sets: logical NOT (the negation principle) and logical AND (the intersection or minimum principle). Together, these two principles can be used to calculate all possible combinations of the multiple fuzzy sets being analysed.
In contrast, more systematic studies contributing to the global welfare regimes debate have relied heavily on cluster analysis (see Table 1 ), a method that has considerable weaknesses in its power to allocate welfare systems to ideal types, particularly when conceptually distinct components are being analysed as part of the welfare mix (Hudson and Kühner 2010) . More than this, it also cannot be used in a fashion that combines quantitative and qualitative data. It is, therefore, reliant on the use of (rare) data sources that cover a wide sample of nations. Other studies, have relied heavily on case studies of a small number of nations so have lacked any systematic comparison of the author's chosen region with other regions of the world -this has been a particular issues for some discussions of East Asian welfare regimes but has hampered analyses of other regions too (see e.g. Holliday 2000, Aspalter 2006 , Barrientos 2009 ). In both camps, methodological weaknesses have limited the scope and depth of the work: in the former a need to have simple and widely available variables that cover each case restrict the depth and quality of data, while for the latter detailed case study knowledge of a limited number of nations restricts the breadth of the study. *** Table 1 somewhere here*** FSITA can overcome these limitations precisely because it allows substantive knowledge to be used in a broad way when constructing sets. Potentially this enables comparative social policy analysts to exploit the advantages of quantitative indicators -the breadth of coverage that comes from summary measures -with the advantages of case knowledgeadditional context that may be needed to interpret simple indicators. However, to date much of the comparative social policy work utilising fuzzy set methods has proceeded on a cautious basis whereby sets are constructed on the basis of single quantitative indicators but with substantive knowledge used to inform cut off points (see e.g. Ragin 2000 , Pennings 2005 , Kvist 2007 ; more generally see also Vis 2008 , Vis 2009 ). This is an approach to FSITA that follows quantitative analysis norms as closely as possible. It also shares some of the limitations, therefore, of standard quantitative methods, not least that a commonly available indicator that covers each case in the sample is needed for each set.
However, the social policy researcher's substantive knowledge about cases -and, indeed, about statistical indicators -often tells us that a good measure for a set in one case may not be a good measure for the same set in another case. This is particularly so when samples are made up of a large range of countries in which key contexts vary widely. Standard quantitative methods offer us no clear route for combining these kinds of alternative measures into a single study, instead pushing analysts to examine different groups in separate studies. With FSITA, however, this is possible, though we will not pretend that this is easy, straightforward, or even uncontroversial. Indeed, such an approach perhaps pushes the credibility of the method to its limits. In particular, albeit comparatively less severe than in pure macro quantitative approaches, a trade-off remains between the ambition to include in the analysis an increased number of cases and the ability to weight the significance of historical case study evidence and numerical indices equally when calibrating sets. Researchers will continue to rely on information made available by international organisations such as the OECD, IMF and World Bank. Conceptual and methodological issues have been discussed for some of these sources in more detail than for others (see e.g. DeDeken and Kittel 2007) . Indeed, researchers that have experienced shaking heads and other expressions of disbelief by colleagues particularly in middle income countries in regards to how their country is represented in these common international databases may wonder how much these can really teach us beyond the highest income countries. While we argue that FSITA is a powerful tool in alleviating such data availability and reliability issues; it cannot and not should be seen as a panacea. There will always be a certain cost attached to assuming a moderate-N, 'bird's eye' perspective of analysis.
Productive and Protective Welfare Types Revisited
The potential of FSITA in practice is best illustrated by means of an example. Here we draw on our recent classification of welfare states on the basis of their protective and productive dimensions (see Hudson and Kühner, 2009) . We have already noted most attempts to classify welfare states into ideal types follow Esping-Andersen's lead by emphasising the protective intent of social security programmes. More recently, however, this focus on social rights has been challenged. Indeed, Evans and Cerny (2003; Cerny and Evans, 1999) suggest the welfare state has been replaced by a 'competition state', with traditional income protections being gradually dismantled in favour of social investment policies such as education and training that can boost economic competitiveness. Jessop (2000) similarly argues that we have seen the death of the old style 'Keynesian Welfare National State' and the rise of the 'Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime' in which the state constrains social rights in the face of an increasingly competitive global economy. Giddens has forcefully argued that the emergence of globalised knowledge based economy requires greater emphasis on the human investment functions of welfare (Giddens 2006) . Meanwhile, Castells and Himmanen (2002) have argued that some welfare states have adapted their structures in light of the emerging informational society. They point to different models found in the two leading 'informational societies': a largely free-market approach with social protections kept to a minimum in the USA, which contrasts with the approach in Finland which has adapted its strongly interventionist social policy frameworks in a manner that both maintains strong social protection and encourages the modernisation of its economy. All these perspectives place or add an emphasis on the 'productive' dimensions of welfare that invest in human capital.
One of the thorniest questions within both welfare regime analysis and this wider discourse on 'productive welfare' has been how best to classify East Asian states. Indeed, an early criticism of Esping-Andersen's work was that it had misunderstood -and therefore misclassified -Japan, the only East Asian nation included in his typology (Esping-Andersen, 1997) . While, as Esping-Andersen (1999) acknowledges, all classifications rely on simplified ideal types that cannot fully capture the complex reality of actual welfare regimes, several theorists -most notably Holliday (Holliday, 2000; Holliday, 2005; Holliday & Wilding, 2003; Kwon & Holliday, 2007) -have argued that social policy regimes in East Asia can be seen as distinct from the three welfare regimes types articulated by Esping-Andersen because of their productive -rather than protectiveintent. This is a bold claim that presents a direct challenge to dominant approaches in the welfare modelling business 2 .
In order to address these above debates, we (Hudson and Kühner, 2009 ) used FSITA to classify welfare states on the basis of four key components: two reflecting the key protective dimensions found in employment and income protection programmes; and two reflecting productive dimensions found in education and active labour market programmes (ALMPs). Table 2 summarises the variables, data sources and cut-off points we used.
*** Table 2 somewhere here*** These four conceptually rooted dimensions were translated into four fuzzy sets that logically combine to sixteen types. Four of these are 'pure' ideal types. Countries which score high on each of the four fuzzy sets -education investment, training investment, income protection and employment protection -combine both productive and protective elements successfully and constitute the productive-protective ideal type. Countries that score high on both productive sets (education and training investment), but do not make it into the protective sets are purely productive ideal types. Equally, purely protective ideal types score high on income and employment protection but perform less well in education and training investment. Weak ideal types score low on both protective and productive fuzzy sets. The remaining types are hybrids; these are also relevant. Weak productive-protective types each score high only on one of the respective productive and protective fuzzy set variables -i.e. these cases show high education investment paired with either high income or high employment protection or high training investment with either high income or employment protection. Those countries that score high on both productive sets and also on one of the two protective fuzzy sets are labelled productive-plus types. If a country only scores high on one of the productive and none of the protective countries, they were labelled weak productive. Equally, those countries with high scores on both protective and one additional productive fuzzy set are labelled protective-plus types. Weak protective types score high on only one of the two protective fuzzy set variables.
Our findings for 2003 (see Hudson and Kühner 2009) suggest that Finland was at the cross-over point for the productive-protective ideal type, which is interesting since it matched Castells and Himanens' (2002) thesis of the Finnish model being closest to what they call an 'informational welfare state'. Further support for their thesis comes from the USA -which they regard as an unbalanced informational welfare state -being placed strongly within the pure productive set, where it is joined by New Zealand. Both Belgium and Germany were members of the pure protective set, reflecting the corporatist orientation of their welfare arrangements. Meanwhile Australia, along with the UK (which is at the cross-over point), were placed within the weak set according to the data, hinting that these two nations steer a mid-course between the American and European traditions -offering a cut down version of each model -rather than sharing the same features as the USA as suggested by most typologies. All four Scandinavian countries were -at least -very close to combining productive and protective elements similar to Finland. This is an important finding, for it is at odds with Holliday's (2000) argument that protective and productive features are mutually exclusive and the basis of different welfare state types. Contrary to Holliday's (2000) suggestion that a focus on productive welfare forms the basis of an East Asian model, neither of the two included East-Asian countries actually qualifies as a purely productive ideal-type.
Beyond the OECD?
Although there is more to be said about the classifications identified above, we believe that, fuzzy set ideal type analysis produced a robust set of groupings that stand up well to more detailed case based scrutiny (see Hudson and Kühner, 2009 for a fuller discussion). A further strength of the approach lies in how the method combines indicators for different dimensions (Hudson and Kühner, 2010) : the 'dependent variable problem' is no longer only a problem of conceptualisation and indicator operationalisation for as analysts have increasingly acknowledged the multidimensional character of welfare states, it has also become an issue of choosing the most appropriate methodological technique to determine country membership of theoretically-informed ideal-types. Statistical methods rooted in averaging processes (e.g. indices, cluster analysis, factor analysis) work well when dealing with a single component of welfare, but they struggle to cope with more complex pictures of welfare that highlight multiple, conceptually distinct and 'antithetical', components of welfare. Fuzzy set ideal type analysis, meanwhile, excels in offering just such an analysis because distinct and conceptually rooted sets are its starting point. Weakness in one area cannot be compensated for by strength in another with fuzzy set approaches.
However, our operationalisation of the fuzzy set ideal type analysis was cautious in our initial study (Hudson and Kühner, 2009) , following quantitative norms to a large degree. In particular, we drew our set memberships entirely on the basis of OECD statistical information -albeit using substantive knowledge to help inform cut-off points for each set. A more radical approach would depart from these quantitative norms, using qualitative data to supplement or even replace quantitative data in determining set memberships. We believe that this ability to utilise data of different types -and, consequently, from different sources -is another strength that fuzzy set ideal type analysis can bring to the welfare modelling business and, crucially, one that can help us undertake analysis beyond the OECD nations. There are a number of reasons for wishing to extend the analysis of welfare models beyond the high-income countries but the barriers to so doing are not insubstantial. Chief amongst them is a significant practical hurdle: detailed and comparable quantitative data on welfare state activity is hard to come by for non-OECD nations. Whilst a growing number of international organisations now publish data relating to non-OECD nations (e.g. UNDP, WB, IMF, ILO), this data is much less detailed, patchier in terms of the availability of indicators and often restricted to very general measures. On top of this, the dependent variable problem is magnified when countries operating in very different contexts are compared, a problem illustrated well by the UNDP Human Development Index which provides a reasonable comparison of nations in broad terms but is too crude an instrument to provide fine-grained judgements on the differences of well-being between the richest nations of the world. We believe that fuzzy set ideal type analysis is strongly placed to address these challenges and proceed now to offer such an analysis.
Beyond the OECD: Calibration of Sets
We initially looked at a total of 81 nations classified by the World Bank as upper-middle and high-income and with a total population over 500,000. However, data availability restricted our data sample even within these parameters: 21 of these 81 countries did not report or only insufficiently report to the International Monetary Fund's Government Financial Statistics database, our source for education, health and social security spending figures 3 . Another five countries were not covered in the ILO data (2010) or did not provide information needed for our analysis. This left us with a total of 55 countries with a complete set of data, adding to the 30 OECD nations a further 25 countries that are on the cusp of the OECD's level of wealth but excluding very small island states.
Within this sample there is still a significant variation in the context in which social policy operates and for the purposes of our argument we have drawn a broad distinction between those nations that the ILO (2010) classify as having highly commodified labour markets and those with less commodifed labour markets -the latter being those with more than 20 per cent of workers in non-wage (i.e. informal) employment. This distinction becomes important methodologically: as a first, admittedly crude, step some nations will be treated to different membership tests for a set on this basis and we organize our findings with reference to the levels of commodification too.
For our employment protection set, we supplemented the data from the OECD Employment Protection Legislation index used in our original study with data from the World Bank Rigidity of Employment Index (REI). The latter relates to 2008 and was published in 2010; we also took the opportunity of updating the EPL data for our OECD nations. Though ostensibly measuring the same activity, i.e. the strength of employment protection, the specifics of the EPL and REI vary considerably in practice. This required us to cross-reference the two data sources using key cases found in both data sets and via visual examinations of scatterplots of the indicators for these common cases (i.e. nations in both data sets). The key reference cases for transformation of the REI data to a sixpoint fuzzy set calibrated with our EPL based set were as follows: Table 4 summarises the calibrated cut off points for the REI data. Given the simplified six-point fuzzy set used for this data rather than the continuous scale variable used in our initial study -a reflection of the less precise approach to constructing the set -we also recoded the EPL based continuous variable into a six point set and Table 4 outlines the protocol for this too. Table 4 somewhere here*** Following this initial calibration, we cross-referenced the generated set scores with case study knowledge in order to assess their veracity. A key question for us here -especially c r u c i a l g i v e n t h e d i f f e r e n t d a t a s o u r c e s -w a s w h e t h e r t h e s e t m e m b e r s h i p s a r e constructed in a fashion that respects the differences between the countries with high and low levels of labour market commodification. Our conclusion was some caution needs to be injected into interpreting this set: the level of informal employment in some cases creates a very different context for employment regulation policies. The REI captures data from the largest city(ies) in each nation and only looks at the rules for SMEs -this automatically places the focus on the rules for those in formal employment in urban areas. Obviously this needs to be borne in mind when interpreting ideal type memberships for the set does not capture the level of protection for the whole nation. Nonetheless, our view is that the differing data sources automatically build in a fair relaxation of the test for joining the employment protection set for nations with low levels of labour market commodification: if, as for the OECD nations, data covered the whole nation, this would automatically exclude virtually all of the non-OECD nations from the set. Indeed, we are examining the balance of welfare between productive and protective welfare rather than the efficacy of welfare in each nation.
***
For the education investment set we used the percentage of total welfare spending accounted for by education. We also utilised the same cut-off points for our sets (25% fully in; 15% fully out). The measure was calculated using World Bank data for the 2004-6 period. Though slight variations exist between the accounting practices of the OECD and World Bank, these are not of an order to require cross-referencing between common cases in order to calibrate the different data sources. While there could be a problem in utilising the same measures for all cases -the education share will tend to be higher in less mature, developmental welfare systems -ultimately, as mentioned above, this set is about policy makers' intent in terms of where they place the balance of their spending efforts. It is therefore still valid, although we stress that it tells us little about the effectiveness of policy, which is not the focus of our analysis here. The final stage in terms of constructing this set was to convert data from a continuous scale to a six point set in order to simplify the analysis. Here we followed the approach used for transforming our EPL set.
We faced considerable challenges with the income protection set. The key issue here is that we used a very strict measure of protective intent in our original study, examining the income replacement rates of benefits provided to a long term unemployed single worker with no children (Hudson and Kühner, 2009 ). The extensive data provided by the OECD on the tax and benefit systems of its members allows for very fine grained analysis of social supports of this kind. No comparable measure exists outside of the OECD. However, as with the employment protection set, it seems unlikely that such a measure would provide a fair test of protective intent for lower income nations and/or those with less mature welfare systems: indeed, our substantive knowledge would lead us to conclude it is not.
Following the approach we used in a subsequent study (Hudson and Kühner, 2011) , a second best measure - Botero et al's (2003) unemployment sub-index of their social security index -was considered. However, though arguably the most comprehensive index available, it is rather dated, examining the picture in 1997 for most countries in its sample. Cross referencing data from Botero et al's index with data from the OECD pointed to some significant inconsistencies and case knowledge of those inconsistencies lead us to conclude that the depth of reform in some nations since 1997 rendered usage of Botero et al's data problematic.
This left us with very limited options: in the absence of an authoritative data source that was up-to-date we could not simply utilise quantitative indicators. Equally the large number of cases in our sample of 51 nations precluded a very detailed case study analysis of each system. A compromise position involved consulting the US Social Security Administration's (2010) Social Security Systems Throughout the World, supplemented with coverage data from the ILO (2010). The SSA database carries detailed descriptions of the programme rules for a very large sample of social security systems across the globe and has informed other studies using fuzzy sets (see e.g. Vis 2009 ). Data was extracted from these accounts of key dimensions of each nation's system of support for the unemployed. Given that only mature welfare states tend to offer extensive support for the long term unemployed, here we focused on support for the unemployed in general, examining the coverage of unemployment protection schemes, the length and size of contributions to a scheme required in order to qualify for unemployment benefits and the level of income replaced by benefits. Table 5 lists the programme features examined on this basis and how they were scored. Summaries of the programme data and scores for each case can be found in the statistical Appendix to this paper. *** Table 5 somewhere here*** We collected OECD data on replacement rates for long term unemployed single average wage production works with no children for those nations where this is possible but updated for 2008 (Netherlands 2007; Cyprus 2007) . This data was fuzzified into a continuous scale set using the cut-off points of 20% (fully out) and 70% (fully in), as with our initial study, but then transformed into a six-point scale as with the other sets described above. The latest version of the OECD's Benefits and Wages included data for some non-OECD cases; in such instances, determining which measure of set membership to use (i.e. OECD or SSA) was informed by ILO data on the degree of labour market commodification, with the SSA data used to allocate set scores for those with less commodified labour markets.
Finally, for the training investment set we again utilised updated data for the OECD nations, drawing on the latest statistics for 2005-7 from OECD and similar data from EUROSTAT for non-OECD EU members. However, a reclassification of this data into new headings meant we could not follow the approach used in our initial study fully: spending under the headings of 'Training' and 'Supported employment and rehabilitation' were included as productive; other elements (Labour market services; Training; Job rotation and job sharing; Employment incentives; Direct job creation; Start-up incentives) as non-productive. We used the same anchors as in our original study, calculating 'productive' ALMP spending as a share of total ALMP spending and with 20% being fully out of the set and 80% fully in.
For other nations, however, the challenge of assigning set membership was very difficult i n d e e d . T h e d a t a p r o v i d e d b y t h e O E C D i s v e r y f i n e g r a i n e d a n d a l l o w s u s t o disaggregate total ALMP spending into different components. The ability to disaggregate in specific components is instrumental since we are interested not in the total amount spend on ALMPs, but in comparing the weight of spending within the ALMP budget. Eurostat data allows us to expand the scope of analysis beyond OECD countries by offering this kind of data for a number of Central and Eastern European countries. However, data availability beyond these two groups of countries is limited. The ADB (2008b) includes data on labour market spending, but does not break these down into single components. Labour market training spending is not provided for most of the countries in East Asia. Other databases, such as the ILO Key Indicators of Labour Markets (KILM), and large-scale assessment studies of ALMPs in developing and transitional countries (see Lehman and Kluve 2008, Betcherman et al. 2004 ) do not provide systematic ALMP spending data that goes beyond those offered by the OECD/Eurostat. Clearly this lack of data is problematic for our analysis and, in order to address the questions of global welfare regimes by way of including a wider sample of countries, we only have the choice between the two strategies proposed in Hudson and Kühner (2011) . We accept that these strategies may be seen as contentious by some readers and therefore would argue that our findings should only be seen as tentative at this point.
The first, and in a way preferable, option is to use qualitative knowledge of the cases to allocate scores for each nation with missing ALMP statistics. But this approach is by no means an easy way out. Our ambition is to add these nations to our original classification. Therefore, scores assigned on the basis of our qualitative knowledge must be meaningful when compared to scores in our original study of 23 nations. Also, as the number of cases increases in our sample, it gets more and more challenging to accumulate the qualitative knowledge necessary to assign set membership in a confident manner. Our review of available data and cross-national studies of ALMPs (e.g. ADB, 2008; Benson & Zhu, 2005; Betcherman et al, 2001; ILO, 2001 ILO, , 2005 ILO, , 2008 suggested that Korea is likely to have the most extensive set of ALMPs in our sample of seven East Asian regimes and, possibly, Japan to have the second most extensive. We thus concluded that if this broad view of little tradition of training based ALMPs in the region, with Korea as the leader here, is correct, then we could score Korea as just out of the set and place the other East Asian cases alongside Japan as fully out of the set. *** Table 6 somewhere here*** The picture is more complicated for non-OECD countries beyond East Asia. ALMPs have gained significance in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America recen tly bu t b ot h t he exte nt and f ocu s of A LM Ps vary (Bet che rman et al. 2004) . Consequently, it is extremely difficult to assign membership scores for the LMT set without further systematic statistical evidence or qualitative knowledge of the included Central European and Latin American cases. So, we are forced to present our analysis in two stages: first, using all four dimensions -including the crude interpretation of labour market training investment for the OECD and East Asian tigers; and second, omitting the LMT dimension from the analysis for the entire sample of countries. The latter is a very crude solution in particular, since it does not chime well with our theoretical identification of the four fuzzy sets. Either way, this simplified approach produces a property space based on just three dimensions; Table 6 outlines this model.
Beyond the OECD: Findings.
Using the above methods, our findings (see Table 7 ) using the updated and extended data are in line with our earlier challenge to Holiday (2000) . It is again the United States and New Zealand, and not the East Asian countries that are placed most firmly in the purely productive type. Korea joins the productive-protective set -i.e. rather than subordinating protective to productive welfare functions, it manages to combine both to a significant extent. Japan now joins the group of 'weak' countries. China and Hong Kong are both placed in the weak protective-productive set -albeit with different set membership. They are very different in terms of their employment protection legislation scores: while Hong Kong is fully out of this set, China is mostly but not fully in. At the same time, China is more or less out of the income protection set, mainly because relatively generous unemployment protection only reaches a very small proportion of the unemployed (ILO 2010). Finally, Malaysia and Singapore remain closest to the purely productive ideal type. Indeed, Singapore is the only country next to the United States that is fully in the education investment set and fully out of both the income and employment protection legislation sets. *** Table 7 somewhere here*** There are some important changes, for theoretical reasons, in the country memberships of the OECD nations when using the updated data. These findings suggest that more detailed case studies may be warranted to understand these changes more fully -and indeed to test the robustness of the country classifications as well as the chosen data and cut-off points across the four sets: Finland was situated at the cross-over point for the productive-protective ideal type for the 2003 data (Hudson and Kühner 2009) . After losing its membership of the income protection and education investment set, it is now merely a member of the weak-productive-protective type -alongside a fairly diverse group of countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania and the aforementioned China and Hong Kong. Similarly, while being very close to the productivep r o t e c t i v e i d e a l t y p e i n 2 0 0 3 , S w e d e n w a s m o r e o r l e s s o u t o f b o t h t h e i n c o m e protection and education investment set in 2008 too. By reducing its LMT budget by almost a third and by raising the money spent on employment incentives at the same time, the OECD data suggests that Sweden has shifted its approach to ALMPs. There are still a number of countries that manage to combine, or are very close to combining, both productive and protective forms of welfare, namely Denmark and Norway -joined this time by a group of more unlikely candidates Poland, Mexico and Turkey all of which, however, have been assigned membership scores on the basis of there relatively high informal markets. Austria kept its place in the protective-plus ideal type. Meanwhile, the Netherlands, due to increases in the relative share of education spending, has moved right to the crossover of the productive-protective ideal-type. Belgium remains the only purely protective country as Germany joins the weak protective set after changes in unemployment protection really came into effect since 2005. *** Table 8 somewhere here***
The three-dimension model confirms studies underlining regional variation of welfare systems; our preliminary findings would argue against classifications that are oriented along broad geographical units. Similar to above, these findings maybe helpful to suggesting ensuing case study analyses: The Russian Federation joins Latvia in the productive-protective ideal type; Kazakhstan joins the productive-protective (income set), while Lithuania, Poland and Romania are now all firmly in the productive-protective ( E P L ) s e t . C r o a t i a i s t h e m o s t p r o t e c t i v e c o u n t r y i n o u r s a m p l e -f u l l y i n t h e employment and almost fully in the income protection set while at the same time fully out of the education investment set. Bulgaria joins the weak ideal type. As for the Latin American nations, Venezuela is fully in the employment protection and education investment set, while the Dominican Republic joins the purely productive countries. Chile and Mexico scores similarly across the three dimensions and join the productiveprotective (EPL) ideal-type. Brazil features equally high employment protection legislation scores as Chile and Mexico, but fails to match the relative levels of education investment. Uruguay shows very different characteristics yet again: it also fails to join the education investment set, but is more or less in the income protection set. Employment protection is much weaker in Uruguay compared to Chile, Mexico and Brazil. Argentina a n d C o l o m b i a a r e m e m b e r s o f t h e w e a k i d e a l -t y p e : A r g e n t i n a i s f u l l y o u t o f t h e education investment set and more or less out of the income and employment protection sets; Colombia is more or less out of the employment protection and education set. It is almost fully out of the income protection set.
Conclusions: FSITA and Global Welfare Types
What, then, has our attempt to utilise FSITA for an analysis of welfare in some 55 cases shown? While we have not had the space here to analyse in great detail the implications of our classification for each particular case, we hope, in substantive terms, that at the very least we have underlined still further the view that welfare state types do not simply interface with regional blocs when it comes to the balance between productive and protective dimensions of welfare. We find diversity within Europe, within East Asia and within South America. Likewise there is no clear division between nations with highly or less highly commodified labour markets. As for the productive welfarism argument, there is strong evidence that East Asia is not the exemplar of this approach. Nevertheless, as the main focus of this paper has been about the potential of FSITA methods, and indeed in the face of the preliminary character of these results, we will refrain from the temptation to further analyse our findings.
Data quality and availability typically becomes more of an issue, the more one wants to capture cases outside of the high-income OECD. In the light of this, interesting cases are still being excluded from analysis too often; studies are still too often forced to revert to what could be labelled 'lowest common denominator' indicators to ensure inclusion of a wide-as-possible country sample. By way of using our recent work on the productive and protective dimensions of welfare we have shown FSITA can overcome some of these issues by providing researchers with the opportunity to combine quantitative statistics and qualitative knowledge of cases systematically as basis for the assignment of membership scores. By doing so, we have demonstrated FSITA allows for careful contextualisation of cases and as such utilizing different types of quantitative evidence might not always be born out of necessity, but may be called for on theoretical grounds.
As a consequence, FSITA has considerable advantages in allowing us to broaden the sample of countries analysed. For some time it has been clear that comparative social policy analysts have been constrained by data availability issues in their efforts to create typologies that go beyond the OECD. The restricting factor here -the choice between using the best possible data but constricting the analysis only to high income countries or using measures that are of lower quality in order to expand the sample of cases -can be transcended through the use of FSITA as we have shown here. We do not pretend that such an approach is straightforward or without problems of its own, but if we are serious about expanding the analysis of welfare state types beyond the OECD then it seems foolish to make the first step in such an approach the abandonment of the best datasets available to social policy analysts. Instead, calibrating data from multiple sources by cross-referencing common cases in these sources and, in so doing, referring back to substantive knowledge of countries, data sources and concepts offers a more nuanced way forward. Crucially, such an approach allows us to assign membership scores to different countries in different ways. Whilst this may be contentious -and certainly transgresses the norms of quantitative research -it is worth stressing here that countries are concepts too 5 and if the researcher's substantive knowledge suggests clear differences in context mean that key concepts need to measured differently in some cases compared to others then why should this be disallowed?
Finally the big picture issue is that the methodological advantages we outline here offer the potential for significant theoretical development in the welfare typology debate. This debate itself is now at a mature stage and two decades after Esping-Andersen's (1990) seminal book it seems odd that despite major changes in the world order much of the welfare modelling research still fails to encompass the far larger group of nations that can be presumed to be 'welfare capitalist' states than was case in the 1980s. Pragmatic and very human constraints relating to the availability of quantitative data on the one hand and limits to the number of cases individuals can have deeper qualitative knowledge about have been the constraining factors here. But this seems an increasingly feeble argument in the contemporary world. Peter Baldwin (1996: 29) is dismissive of the welfare modelling business, arguing that 'Typologizing (...) is the lowest form of intellectual endeavour, parallel to the works of bean-counters and bookkeepers'. Perhaps this is so when purely quantitative approaches take us away from exploring the cases themselves. Because FSITA still allows us to be frugal in our data collection compared to the very detailed historical analyses of cases Baldwin favours, we can gain some of the contemporary relevance that the work of Baldwin or Esping-Andersen lacks. China has a dozen cities with populations that exceed that of Finland and the population of Brazil's largest city, São Paulo, exceeds that of 20 EU member states. If there is a purpose to typologising, surely, it is to help us to learn more about key cases and to help us in developing robust theories about the pressures welfare systems face and how they respond to them. Finding appropriate methodological tools for allowing us to look beyond the OECD in our typologising seems essential if our typologies are to retain their theoretical purchase. The insured must have at least 9 months of coverage.
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